A VISUAL FIELD GUIDE TO CLIENT-SIDE VALIDATION

Bitcoin sees the anchor. The receiver verifies the asset.

Six short films compare the architectures, trace their proof models, measure performance, and put formal verification inside its proper trust boundary.

06
FILMS 05:20 total runtime
1080P 30 frames per second
OPEN Research in motion

FIELD NOTE 01 / OVERVIEW

Four architectures. One family tree.

The same Bitcoin base, four related designs—compared by ownership, receive work, public data, and the lesson each branch contributed.

01:00

THE PROTOCOLS / ONE AT A TIME

02 — 04

FIELD NOTE 02 / SHIELDED CSV

Private coins.
Public spend order.

The sender proves a valid private state transition, Bitcoin orders the spend, and the receiver gets a fresh coin plus a proof-carrying record.

  • ≈64 B paper target after publisher aggregation
  • O(1) receiver-side validation
  • PCD recursive proof-carrying data
00:45

FIELD NOTE 03 / TAPROOT ASSETS

Assets inside
Taproot outputs.

Asset commitments live beneath a Taproot output. Proof files move off-chain, trace lineage to genesis, and can travel over Lightning.

  • UTXO ownership and liveness
  • MS-SMT asset commitments
  • LN issued-asset channels
00:45

FIELD NOTE 04 / RGB

Contract state
Bitcoin never sees.

A single-use seal ties contract rights to a Bitcoin outpoint. The recipient receives a private consignment and replays the relevant history.

  • SEAL closes once on Bitcoin
  • CSV client-side validation
  • LOCAL contract state and history
00:45

FIELD NOTE 05 / MEASURED

Sixteen rows. No borrowed number.

The current proof-native circuit contains 16 rows and 361 columns. A hiding payment proof completes in roughly 10–20 ms on the measured laptop; its signed-iOS rerun is still pending.

0.01–0.02s HIDING PROVE
1.6ms HIDING VERIFY
117.2KB HIDING PROOF

Laptop CPU measurement. The earlier phone cohort described the deleted signature circuit and is not a current claim.

00:50

FIELD NOTE 06 / FORMAL VERIFICATION

The checker is part of the threat model.

Ultraviolet writes adversarial state models in Quint, checks their invariants with Apalache, replays generated traces against Rust, and applies Kani to selected production functions.

Then the July 2026 AI-assisted Collatz artifact shows the limit: two checkers accepted it through two different bugs. A green check proves only what the full toolchain actually checked.

7MODEL FILES
38MODEL CHECKS
3VERIFICATION TIERS
01:15

THE DESIGN QUESTION

How much history should
a receiver have to carry?

Ultraviolet explores constant-size receive proofs for private client-side validation on Bitcoin.